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Abstract—The ISO/IEC 60870-5-104 standard for sending
telecontrol messages first published in 2000 does not include
security features, although the ISO/IEC 62351 standard adds
features such as integrity protection and authentication even if
this is not yet widely used.
However, in this paper we argue that even in the presence of
such security extensions, it is still possible to realise attacks by
subverting the temporal relation between APDUs which imple-
mentations assume to be correct. To this end we have investigated
attacks against the Network Time Protocol (NTP) used for clock
synchronisation in most implementations and demonstrate that
Master and Slave entities or other entities including intrusion
detection sensors can be made to obtain messages with different
time-stamps. This can lead to the assumption of causality reversal
and will affect both control loops and process reconstruction
by auditing, monitoring, and intrusion detection system. We
demonstrate these results analytically and in a scenario based on
a simulation framework allowing the study of different topologies
and their varying effects on the visibility of messages and time
synchronisation before proposing a mitigation mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ISO/IEC 60870-5-104 standard is an extension of the
ISO/IEC 60870-5-101 that allows the protocols for power
system monitoring and telecontrol based on open TCP/IP
standards. This permits the deployment of far more flexible
telecontrol topologies including interconnections over wide-
area networks, but also opens up two problem domains which
the present paper seeks to demonstrate are closely linked.
The security of ISO/IEC 60870-5-101 communications re-
lies on the assumption of closed communication links that can
be point-to-point or multidrop mechanisms and has explicit
time-synchronisation; for this purpose the standard defines
time and synchronisation in clause 6.8 of IEC-60870-5-4 and
is used in IIEC 60870-5-101, IEC-60870-5-102, IEC-60870-
5-103, and IEC-60870-5-104, respectively. Whilst typically
not required the maximum resolution possible in the ISO/IEC
60870 for clocks and time tags is 1ms.
In the case of ISO/IEC 60870-5-104 communication, par-
ticularly when operating over wide-area networks, time syn-
chronisation is more critical since one cannot assume that
messages are obtained by master and slave stations at the time
of receipt. Instead, telemetry skew caused by communication
delays or scan rates will result in even the same operation
being processed in different locations to be associated with
different time stamps. To obtain correct baseline timestamps,
and also to preserve causality relations, robust synchronisation
is essential, and for interoperability and regulatory purposes
must be linked to a recognised source such as recommended
by NERC [14].
Whilst synchronisation against GNSS sources such as GPS
is possible in a decentralised manner, multiple endpoints
would not only be required to still distribute the signal from a
receiver, but as civilian GPS signals are susceptible to spoofing
and jamming also from inexpensive equipment [20], this is in
itself problematic as has particularly been demonstrated for
IEEE C37.118 synchrophasors [17]; analogous arguments hold
for unprotected DCF77 and IRIG-B signals.
Hence most configurations will, even if atomic clocks or
GNSS time references are used, or where the native ISO/IEC
60870-5-101 or -104 mechanisms are employed, rely on the
Network Time Protocol (NTP) or a simplified variant (SNTP),
currently in version 4 [5], [12], but originally designed in
1985. Although authentication mechanisms exist [6], these
are currently not used widely in public systems which are
subject to attacks against protocol and implementations [2],
[9] including on path and hijacking attacks where it is not
required to interpose an attacker in the path between an NTP
time source and its consumer. Moreover, further attacks have
been proposed also for authenticated variants [10], limiting the
utility of current authentication mechanisms.
In this paper we argue that an attacker can achieve desyn-
chronisation between the observed time tags of events between
master and (multiple) slave nodes by altering the NTP syn-
chronisation of target nodes, thereby achieving objectives such
as causality reversal that may harm control loops and further
rendering auditing and intrusion detection more difficult.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II briefly defines the problem and current approaches before
discussing related work in section III. To demonstrate the
feasibility of attacks, we outline underlying assumptions and
describe the attack in section IV before describing the effect in
a simulation environment in section V, proposing a mitigation
mechanism in section VI, and giving conclusions in section
VII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The NTP protocol specifies a hierarchical relation among
numbered server strata where lower strata are acting as
sources, although lateral peer-to-peer configurations among
servers in the same stratum are permitted. Stratum 0 is taken to
have a synchronisation source such as a high-precision atomic
clock or an augmented GNSS receiver.
Clients will retrieve estimated times and error intervals from
pre-configured lists of servers, and synchronises to a time
interval on which at least half of the queried servers can agree.
In a general network context this offers some protection, but
power systems may not always be configured with sufficient
diversity for this mechanism to be effective.
The ISO/IEC 60870-5-104 protocol must rely on either local
synchronisation against high-precision time sources, typically
a GPS receiver, or on (S)NTP as the ISO/IEC 60870-5-5
synchronisation mechanism is not available unless the con-
figuration is sufficiently compact that the maximum network
delay will be less than the required accuracy of the receiving
station.
Master and slave nodes must hence generally rely on NTP
for synchronisation, and although within power systems the
use of authenticated NTP is feasible and desirable [6], we
argue that weaknesses in currently deployed security mecha-
nisms make attacks possible even in the presence of these secu-
rity mechanisms whilst more recent developments considered
by the IETF Network Time Security (NTS) working group
are still in train. This, however, results in current standards
for authentication having to be considered ineffective as the
relevant cryptographic primitives have been demonstrated as
inadequate. While a number of identity schemes for proving re-
mote system identity and preventing man-in-the-middle attacks
are proposed, the Autokey schema has long been known to be
weak, while MAC calculations in pre-shared key environments
rely on the obsolete MD5 hash algorithm.
This allows attackers able to inject messages visi-
ble by ISO/IEC 60870-5-104 stations to induce a mis-
synchronisation. We propose to target systems such that in
a given master/slave pair (or correspondingly for multiple
slaves), this will result in a different ordering of events or
causality.
III. RELATED WORK
Although widely used in telecontrol of power systems
particularly in Europe, research on security and vulnerabilities
of the ISO/IEC 60870-5-104 protocol and its supporting pro-
tocols has been limited when compared to e.g. DNP3 (IEEE
1815) [3], [18]. The basic variant of the protocol does not
incorporate (data origin) authentication or integrity verification
and is hence vulnerable to straightforward man-in-the-middle
attacks [11]; at the same time current implementations are
less robust than desirable [8]. However, the basic issues found
related to DNP3 documented in [3] such as susceptibility to
replay and spoofing attacks in addition to man-in-the-middle
scenarios are well-documented.
However, although at present not widely deployed, the
integration of security mechanisms found in ISO/IEC 62351
addresses the majority of these vulnerabilities in the baseline
protocol. What is not covered by this additional security are the
supporting protocols, particularly time synchronisation. Here
[25] identifies the main mechanisms in which desynchroni-
sation attacks can be achieved, namely direct modification
of time values, masqerading as the master clock, replaying
old messages, denial of service, and delay of synchronisation.
In particular, delay attacks have gained attention [13], [16]
Surprisingly, the IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol used
more commonly in closed network segments has received
more attention in this regard [15], [21], [22]. We note that the
use of authentication mechanisms no longer protects against
attacks considered as mitigated by Ullmann et al. [25], but that
synchronisation mechanisms are susceptible regardless, allow-
ing attackers to skew client clocks relative to the referenced
master clock. Whilst the so-called panic threshold in NTP is
1000s that would result in a client abandoning a given server,
this is far more than the round-trip time required to influence
control loops in power systems. As shown by Malhotra et al.
[9], moreover, the NTP Kiss of Death mechanism can also be
misused to temporarily interrupt legitimate synchronisation.
Most recent research into the security of ISO/IEC 60870-
5-104 focuses on intrusion detection [26], but we note that
regardless of whether signature-based [24], anomaly-based
[23], or specification-based systems [1], all depend on correct
message ordering as well.
IV. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
In the following sections we explore how the time seen
by ISO/IEC 60870-5-104 nodes can be shifted relative to one
another, causing desynchronisation and second-order effects
such as mis-compensation in control loops. A number of
request types (PID) in the standard explicitly make reference
to time tags in request and response APDUs (e.g. 30,31,58,
and 63), allowing straightforward targeting.
For this to be successful, it is immaterial if the protocol is
protected by ISO/IEC 62351-5 as the attack is against the time
referenced by endpoints rather than communication channels.
However, several assumptions must hold:
Authentication Current NTP as specified in RFC 5905
[12] relies on MD5 HMACs for messages, which
is susceptible to chosen prefix collision attacks [19].
Access The proposed attack assumes that the attacker is
able to read and write messages on the target net-
work; the exact mechanism used for such an attack
is beyond the scope of this paper.
Topology The proposed attack assumes a non-flat network
topology such that NTP traffic for a given master and
slave combination is not visible at the same time to
a monitoring entity.
V. ANALYSIS AND SCENARIO
We have choice to recreate a plausible research framework
(named CHAOS) which contains SCADA IEC104 clients and
one IEC104 server,the NTP servers and a storage server as
showed in 1.
Fig. 1. CHAOS Framework Network Topology
Three bare metal PC are used as hosts using linux Ubuntu
16.04 LTS and Virtualbox is the chosen hypervisor. The net-
working service is performed by PFsense, an open source BSD
based firewall-router software which is hosted by some virtual
machine spreader inside the whole framework. A PFsense
bare metal installation PC works as both peripheral firewall
and central router for interconnecting the whole host PCs.
Other virtualized PFsense based routers operate in the network
providing network stratification and further data traffic security
by implementing PFsense routers at each sub-network branch.
CHAOS framework can both works as a standalone plat-
form and even connected to a real SCADA RTU simply by
reconfiguring the border router: when the framework works in
standalone mode the main peripheral router/firewall isolates
all sub-networks blocking the IN/OUT communications, espe-
cially the NTP UDP port 123 (proper of NTP service). We
choice to run the framework as standalone platform with its
own time source provided by one of the PC. Even if using the
local PC time as time source, we wanted our system isolated
from the real stratus 1 (e.g. google time servers) in order to
have full control over the timing infrastructure. The whole
framework NTP infrastructure is represented in figure 2:
where a physical PC provides the time to the other levels
(stratum 2 and stratum 3) up to stratus 4 which represents
the NTP client of the IEC104 client/server units. The NTP
infrastructure (figure 2) also has some peer-to-peer link in
order to guarantee a certain degree of redundancy. Also, in
order guarantee the max flexibility we used Ubuntu server
OS based virtual machine as NTP client/server for both the
stratum 2 and stratum 3. Also PFsense offers an NTP client-
server daemon which we used for providing time reference to
the sub-networks we connected to.






Fig. 2. CHAOS framework NTP Structure
In our simulation framework the NTP client/servers im-
plements the MD5 symmetric authentication assuming that
an attacker has already performed a collision attack against
one or more NTP servers which allowed him to connect to
the other NTP servers. How the collision attackto the MD5
authentication happen is not part of this work.
We decided to tamper two different NTP servers at stratum
2 ad stratum 3 in order to see how the ”malicious” time
settings propagate across the NTP network. BY manipulating
the time source we introduce a consistent time jitter which
can be interpreted by lower level NTP server like as the time
source server has lost synchronization, hence the NTp time
source with a minor time jitter can be used putting the other
time sources on a candidate mode state. However, this scenario
might hot happen when the attacked NTP server is set as prefer
with respect to the other ones.
The IEC 60870-5-104 client - or even server - by receiving
the ”malicious” time from the external sources, starts to use the
malicious time on the IEC 60870-5-104 APDUs timestamps.
The receiving server might identifies wrong timing and wait
for any packets source synchronization or, in the worst sce-
nario, uses receiver’s local time for updating the the received
time packet’s time stamp. Anyway, when time gap between
the sent command request and the relative command answer
becomes too wide, also when the NTP server resynchronize
itself with a not tampered higher level time source, the IEC
request-reply historian becomes ambiguous and hard to de-
terminate which particular request has produces a subsequent
answer from the IEC 104 server.
The figure 3 is the visual representation of the timing shift
described above on a modified Minkowski graphic: y − axes
represents the IEC PID request sent to a server and on x−axes
there’s its relative response. Since the communication time
delay is random the curve represents the time flow and the












Fig. 3. Minkowsky Graphic Representation of time variance and relative
effects on request-response timing
Using a different reference system for evaluating the same
sequence of request-response is to be considered in the
presence of attacks as the temporal sequence of events is
completely distorted. It is deduced that several responses-
required can be superimposed if we change the adopted time
reference.
A. Mitigating the Attacks Effects
Both in section III and in the section V we have seen the
ease with which any hacker can tamper with the global timing
system NTP, whose his security concerns relies on the MD5
authentication procedure, also evaluating its impact on time-
dependent protocols IEC 60870-5-104.
In order to mitigate the time drift effect and the consequent
causality re-ordering attack we suggest the following strate-
gies:
APDU Sequence numbering: sequencing the APDUs ex-
changed between the client and the server 60870-5-
104 in such a way that, besides making an eventual
replay attack more difficult to success, they allow to
identity the correct packets reception whenever the
time synchronism is lost due to hardware failures
or even attacks). It is important to point out that
no support or any procedure for correcting the ran-
dom packet re-ordering phenomenon is provided nor
implemented by the NTP protocol or even the IEC-
60870-5-104 protocol: packet sequencing is entrusted
to the TCP or to the NTP transport protocol if
the time stamp NTP is taken as a reference. The
APDUs should be numbered and the sequential num-
ber should be included in the packet before being
sent over the network. Further, to ensure greater
data integrity, the packets sent should contain part,
also the numbering sequence, of the sent message
processed by a hash function.
Reinforced MD5 Authentication: Authentication with
MD5 hashing functions should be replaced or
made more robust by adding a secret sequence of
a reasonable length to the packet on which to do
hashing, that is the salt/pepper hashing method.
Among the two techniques we believe that pepper is
the best solution as the secret sequence is not stored.
However, we discourage the reuse of pepper/salt
sequences to process other packets or data sequences
to encrypt.
Partial Traffic Buffering: The sequence number is also
useful to handle packets whenever these are buffered.
We also count on the ability of both client and
server to recompute the missing/damaged packets;
this means client or server does not have to re-
compute starting from the beginning of a sent packet
series.
VI. MITIGATION
Create mechanism to enforce shared view of message se-
quence per originator with partial ordering over messages at
synchronisation points.
APDUs are to be associated with a sequence number where
a station may start a sequence at a random number on startup
or crash fault.
Each APDU is to be combined with the sequence number
and subjected to a HMAC – assuming a suitable key dis-
tribution mechanism beyond the scope of this paper as this
reflects trust relationships, but may use a schema such as the
one proposed in [4], which creates an effective one-way hash
chain [7].
This can be computed efficiently and distributed out of band
relative to the ISO/IEC 60870-5-104 protocol, resulting in
a partial order for each station that can be verified without
having to assume either correct ordering guaranteed by the
transport mechanism or synchronised time (tags).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has demonstrated that at present the best prac-
tice of securing the ISO/IEC 60870-5-104 protocol with the
ISO/IEC 62351-5 protection profile remains insufficient if
an attacker can gain access to a telecontrol network and is
able to inject delayed or modified NTP messages. Attackers
may de-synchronise control loops, causing undesirable be-
haviour, and may invert or distort causality relations seen by
observers. Whilst mitigation by the introduction of multiple
independent synchronisation sources may be possible, this
implies considerable cost for both deployment of sources and
requisite network topology-based isolation. Instead, we have
proposed an out-of-band mechanism that does not require the
modification of the underlying protocol but which can be used
to validate causality relations.
Ongoing and future work will include a study of the
effectiveness of currently-proposed extensions to the NTP
protocol and mechanisms for the detection of delay and de-
synchronisation attacks.
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